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ABSTRACT  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction: The World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates that together tobacco and alcohol kill about 
9 million people annually despite aggressive and 
widespread public health controls. These legal 
industries persist because of the demand for their 
products and their substantial economic influence, 
which is magnified by the concentration of wealth in 
the executives of leading corporations that profit from 
increased legal drug sales.  
Materials and methods: This preliminary study 
quantifies the link between global premature deaths 
from these legal addictive drugs as a function of 
executive compensation in order to provide the 
necessary data to make more effective policy 
recommendations for preventing legal drug-related 
deaths.  
Results: The results indicate a need to incentivize 
chief executive officers (CEOs), such that they have a 
constant marginal utility per life saved. 
Conclusions: An executive compensation incentive 
that moves to eliminate tobacco use is achieved by a 
pay structure that increases exponentially with the 
number of lives saved.  
Key words: tobacco control; alcohol control; global 
public health; executive compensation  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
      Multi-criteria decision analysis has repeatedly 
found that the legal drugs of tobacco and alcohol cause 
significant harm to both individuals and society [1,2]. 
In particular, the health-related dangers for tobacco [3-
8] and alcohol [6,9-14] are well known to the medical 
community and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) estimates that together these two drugs kill 
about 9 million people annually. These deaths are 
premature deaths, which occur before a person would 
otherwise be expected to die of age and are thus 
considered preventable. Despite substantial effort by 
public health officials to institute control policies [15-
19] such as the WHO's Global Treaty on Tobacco 
Control, which places broad restrictions on the sale, 
advertising, sponsorship, promotion, shipment, and 
taxation of tobacco products [20], the number of 
smokers has increased steadily worldwide and is now 
nearly a billion users [21]. Similarly, despite 61.7% of 
the global population (>15 years) avoiding alcohol 
consumption, there is a worldwide increase in recorded 
alcohol per capita [22]. 
  These legal industries persist because of the 
demand for their products and their substantial 
economic influence: tobacco generated US$722 billion 
in 2013 and alcohol over US$1.4 trillion in revenue 
[23]. This economic influence is magnified by the 
concentration of wealth in the executives of these 
leading corporations that profit from increased drug 
sales. The evidence that the wealthy and thus 
politically powerful have frequently worked together 
to create or perpetuate privilege, often at the expense 
of the national interest (e.g. in this case public health) 
and usually at the expense of the middle and lower 
classes is well established [24]. 
  The aim of this preliminary study is to 
quantify the link between global premature deaths 
from two legal addictive drugs as a function of 
executive compensation in order to provide the 
necessary data to make more effective policy 
recommendations for preventing legal drug-related 
deaths. The results are analyzed and policy 
recommendations are made to decouple this link for 
the benefit of the public health goals of increased 
quality of life and longevity globally. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
  The global earnings per death or death ratio, 
rg(i), is the annual chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation for company i per avoidable death in 
year (t) given by: 
r g(i )(t )=
ci (t )
di (t )
 [US$/avoidable death/year] (1) 
 
where di is the global total deaths caused by the 
company i per year and ci is the summation of annual 
CEO compensation for company i consisting of base 
salary, bonuses and stock options, benefits and other 
forms of remuneration. The total deaths for a given 
year statistically attributed to any specific company 
can be approximated by: 
 
di (t )=D (t)⋅mi (t )  [avoidable deaths/year] (2) 
 
where D is the total deaths attributed to a specific 
industry in year t and mi(t) is the market share (as 
percent of revenue) of a specific company in the 
industry. Similar calculations for the death ratio for a 
specific country and innocents (e.g. second hand 
smokers or drunk driver victims) can be calculated 
substituting Dinn for D, and using the appropriate m. 
 The market share, m, in 2013 for the top eight 
companies in tobacco and top ten in alcohol was 
determined from Euromonitor International's gateway 
Passport (www.portal.euromonitor.com). Inputs for c 
were determined for each individual CEO from 
Bloomberg Businessweek (http://www.bloomberg. 
com/). All monetary units were converted to US$ using 
Dec. 31, 2014 exchange rates published on xe.com. D 
was determined from the WHO, which reports that the 
tobacco industry is annually responsible for more than 
five million direct-deaths from tobacco and an 
additional 600,000 are the result of non-smokers being 
exposed to second-hand smoke [4]. Similarly, WHO 
estimates about 3.3 million deaths due to alcohol 
consumption [12]. For the purposes of a first order 
approximation the errors associated with all of the 
inputs are acceptable.  
 
RESULTS  
 
  The inputs are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 
for the tobacco and alcohol industries, respectively. 
The tables show the company, market share (m) of the 
company, CEO of the company and the annual 
compensation (c) for that CEO. 
 It is clear from Table 1 and 2 that both 
industries are largely controlled by only a few 
companies. The tobacco industry is particularly 
concentrated with only eight companies making 
up >88% of sales. The largest is China National 
Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), which is a special case  
as it is a Chinese state-owned manufacturer with nearly 
a complete monopoly of the Chinese cigarette market. 
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Table 1. The tobacco industry market share for the top eight companies, CEO and CEO compensation for 2013 
 
Company  m [%] CEO c [US$] 
China National Tobacco Corp (CNTC) 43.2% Jiang Chengkang N/A 
Philip Morris International Inc 14.3% André Calantzopoulos $10 906 612 
British American Tobacco Plc 11.6% Nicandro Durante $10 108 434 
Japan Tobacco Inc 9.4% Mitsuomi Koizumi $1 102 570 
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc 4.9% Alison Cooper $4 112 217 
Altria Group Inc 2.3% Martin J. Barrington $20 139 967 
ITC Ltd 1.4%  Yogesh Chander Deveshwar $112 849 000 
Reynolds American Inc 1.3% Daniel M. Delen $10 452 206 
 
 
Table 2. The alcohol industry market share for the top ten companies, CEO and CEO compensation for 2013 
 
Company  m[%] CEO c [US$] 
Anheuser-Busch InBev NV 15.5% Carlos Brito  $7 411 606 
SABMiller Plc 7.6% Alan Clark $10 063 279 
Heineken NV 7.4% Jean-François van Boxmeer  $8 258 114 
Carlsberg A/S 4.9% Jørgen Buhl Rasmussen $3 158 148 
China Resources Enterprise Ltd 4.8% Jie Hong $3 260 000 
Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd 3.4% Ke Xing Huang $250 497 
Molson Coors Brewing Co 2.5% Peter S Swinburn $8 406 628 
Beijing Yanjing Brewery Co Ltd 2.2% Fucheng Li N/A 
Kirin Holdings Co Ltd 2.0% Senji Miyake $1 100 880 
Diageo Plc 1.4% Ivan Menezes $12 095 242 
 
As the CNTC is under the jurisdiction of 
China's State Tobacco Monopoly Administration it 
does not function under the rules of the market that 
other companies must follow, nor is CEO 
compensation made public so it will be excluded from 
further analysis here.  
 
 
The remaining seven tobacco companies make 
up 45% of the global market. Likewise the top ten 
alcohol companies make up 51.7% of their market. The 
results of substituting the solutions of equ. 2 into equ. 
1 are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the tobacco and 
alcohol industries, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 1. The tobacco executive compensation per avoidable death for 2013 
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Figure 2. The alcohol executive compensation per avoidable death for 2013 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 In the tobacco industry the most striking result 
is how little some of top executives are compensated 
per avoidable death, when it is well known that 
approximately 50% of their customers die as a direct 
result of using their product [12]. Overall, as can be 
seen in Figure 1, the death rates in the tobacco industry 
range from a little over $2 of CEO compensation per 
attributable death for Mr. Koizumi of Japan Tobacco to 
over $1,400 per death for Mr. Deveshwar of ITC. 
Likewise, as can be seen in Figure 2, in the alcohol 
industry the death rate ranges from $2.23 for Mr. 
Huang of Tsingtao Brewery up to $261.80 for Mr. 
Menezes of Diageo. If it is assumed that all of the 
CEOs analyzed are attempting to maximize their 
income in order to give to charities to save lives [25], 
these low r values become even clearer. Give Well, an 
organization devoted to calculating the effectiveness of 
charities, found that one of the most effective charities 
is the Against Malaria Foundation, where it costs 
approximately $3,400 to save a human life [26]. What 
this means practically is that even if their entire 
compensation was directed at saving lives, the CEOs 
do not earn enough money to make up for the lives lost 
from selling their companies' products. To make this 
possible, r must be increased, which by following the 
equations can be done by: 1) increasing executive 
compensation or 2) decreasing the mortality rates of 
the products sold by their companies.  
  Thus, restructuring the incentive for CEOs 
could provide a solution to a large public health sector 
paradox: how is it that both alcohol and tobacco 
consumption are increasing globally – becoming what 
some are calling a “crisis” or “epidemic” [3,4,15,19]– 
while there have been enormous efforts to develop and 
implement control policies worldwide?  
Calculating the executive compensation per 
avoidable death from legal drugs provides some clarity 
on this paradox. The answer is all of the control 
policies tried previously, from labeling laws to public 
use bans to taxes, would all act to decrease the revenue 
of the company, the value r and in turn decrease CEO 
compensation, c. So even the most ethical CEO living 
a deprived personal life from nearly 100% charitable 
donation would be a net destroyer of human life. In a 
free market economy all actors are expected to want to 
increase and even maximize the compensation for their 
work and would be expected to fight bitterly if it is 
threatened or reduced. In this way, all of the previous 
control policies have acted against the best long-term 
economic interests of the CEOs of legal drug 
companies, with unfortunate results for global health. 
These CEOs have considerable problem solving ability 
both because of the enormous scale of the multi-billion 
dollar companies they lead, but also from their own 
extremely valuable business acumen. For example, 
consider that Mr. Calantzopoulos is compensated over 
US$10 million for his work, indicating that the board 
of Philip Morris International consider his yearly effort 
more valuable to the company than over 150 highly-
trained and experienced chemical engineers. Thus, it is 
clear for a more effective public health outcome, it 
would be best if the interests of these elite business 
people are aligned with health goals of lower mortality 
and morbidity. To reach this goal it is necessary to 
attempt to increase r and thus c if deaths are reduced. 
To do that, the rules of executive compensation need 
to be altered. 
  Currently, executive compensation limits are 
avoided under the assumption that competition for 
higher compensation will lead to more optimal 
outcomes for the economy and thus the overall society. 
As the simple analysis presented here shows, some 
products (e.g. tobacco and alcohol) have such large 
negative effects on the global scale, they warrant a re-
evaluation of this assumption. The trans-industry 
damage for tobacco and alcohol are so great (for 
example in the U.S. tobacco causes 443,000 deaths 
annually [27] and alcohol causes ~88,000 deaths 
annually [28,29] both of which are orders of magnitude 
above threats such as terrorism for which substantial 
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resources are mobilized to combat) that a small 
intervention may be justified on ethical grounds. In 
particular the upper limit on compensation of 
executives (cl) of companies whose products result in 
substantial death from the use of their products can be 
governed by a formula like: 
 
cl (t )=S1 (t )exp[d0− d( t )S2(t ) ]  [US$] (3) 
where S1 is the base salary (including all forms of 
compensation), d0 is the initial number of deaths per 
year, S2 scales the saved lives, and d(t) is defined 
above. S1 and S2 can be altered to account for inflation 
and other factors and could be set by legislatures in 
each area. S1 should be enough that the executive can 
live normally, but modestly. The utility from the salary 
roughly goes with the logarithm of the salary. 
Therefore, equ. 1 has the salary increasing 
exponentially with the number of lives saved. This 
means that the CEO has a constant utility incentive per 
life saved. Thus the executive compensation would be 
incentivized for more ethical practices. One 
complication is that the sales of drugs often cause 
death much later, so in order to provide immediate 
feedback to the CEO, it may be necessary to predict 
the eventual number of deaths based on sales of 
different products. Within this compensation limit, the 
boards can vary the salaries based on performance or 
other company objectives.  
  The effects of such a policy change, which 
would only affect the work compensation for a very 
small number of individuals would be expected to 
create rapid change. CEOs would immediately have 
the choice between staying at their existing companies 
for a much lower compensation that they are earning 
now in the short term or moving elsewhere in the 
economy. Two outcomes are possible, both of which 
will result in improvements in global public health. 
First, it can be assumed that the CEOs currently 
running the top companies in the tobacco and alcohol 
industries are the most qualified and best at their jobs. 
If some or all choose to leave, their less-qualified 
replacements would be bound by the same rules and 
have the same incentives to reduce d(t) (and in 
aggregate D(t)). All of the CEOs analyzed (and their 
likely replacements) have already have amassed great 
wealth and could be expected to be able to tolerate 
even very low S1 values in the short term. For these 
CEOs unafraid of a challenge to fundamentally change 
their companies, they would be expected to use their 
considerable resources and business skills to 
aggressively reduce d(t) in order to raise their 
compensation limits. They can do this by various 
means such as technically reducing the mortality of 
their products (e.g. shifting to electronic cigarettes), 
changing advertising practices to reduce the number of 
problem drug users, etc. Some interventions could 
work even if only some companies are regulated, such 
as those headquartered in the regulating country. For 
instance, these companies could lobby for laws to ban 
smoking in public spaces like restaurants, which would 
affect all companies selling the product in that country. 
However, shifting to electronic cigarettes by domestic 
companies could be met with foreign companies 
ramping up sales of conventional cigarettes and would 
need to be enforced with trade deals/sanctions/import 
tariffs as is common in ensuring appropriate corporate 
behaviour in other industries. Most likely, however, the 
CEOs would try to diversify their businesses following 
the example of ITC's CEO, who had the largest r in this 
study by a wide margin (Figure 1). ITC is an Indian 
conglomerate and includes diversified businesses in 
consumer goods, agri-business, hotels, paperboards 
and packaging, and information technology. Mr. 
Deveshwar's full compensation ranges between more 
than five times to orders of magnitude higher than his 
competitors in the tobacco industry. This demonstrates 
that diversification in the long-term can be both 
profitable for existing legal drug companies, but also 
financially lucrative for CEOs following this model 
(Table 1). Speculation on how the CEOs would reduce 
d in order to raise r and cl is unnecessary as their 
methods are immaterial to the resultant improved 
global public health outcomes. As the companies take 
on new markets they will invest less in the legal drug 
portion of the business and reduce sales in that area. 
What is important is that by making minor rule 
changes similar to equ. 3 for executive compensation 
for a small group of companies, CEO motivation will 
be aligned directly with optimal public health 
outcomes. This is in contrast to past interventional 
policies, such as bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship, which reduced drug use in 
one region/country, but tended to shift it into other 
markets with poorer, less educated and more 
vulnerable citizens. The expected superior results of 
incentivizing CEOs to reduce deaths would come at 
negligible cost to the tax payers of nations, avoid 
having to outlaw these drugs and the concomitant 
problems associated with enforcement [30], and still 
enable choice for the consumers to use these legal 
drugs. It would be expected that fewer consumers 
would choose addictive and dangerous drugs if these 
industries simply reduced their efforts to sell them, 
which would be a result of a properly incentivized 
CEO shifting resources during diversification. For 
example, in the U.S. in 2011 the tobacco industry spent 
$8.4 billion on cigarette advertising and promotional 
expenses with about $7.0 billion of this expenditure on 
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price discounts to encourage addiction to their 
products [31]. As the health effects of tobacco use is 
well known, the ethics of this practice are at best 
questionable. With CEOs being unwilling to invest 
resources in such efforts that would reduce their 
income, no laws managing advertising, sponsorship or 
promotion would be necessary.  
  There is a history of intervening in CEO 
compensation. For example, a U.S. court ruling in 
1930 found that a tobacco CEO bonus was wasteful 
[32]. In 1993, the U.S. eliminated tax-deductibility to 
the company of CEO pay over $1 million [33]. Also, 
regulated companies like electric utilities have lower 
CEO pay, and this correlates with lower CEO 
educational attainment [34]. Restricting CEO pay for 
economic reasons can have unintended consequences. 
  There are several risks with this approach. 
First, as the large legal drug companies began to 
diversify away from drugs, there is a risk that smaller 
companies could come in to fill the demand. If the 
CEO payment limitation were constant across all 
companies, smaller companies would be less affected 
because their CEOs make less to start with (however, 
the equation could be adjusted based on company 
size). There is likely a reason that the market is so 
concentrated in large companies, so smaller companies 
would likely be less effective. At the same time, the 
smaller companies would not have the resources (e.g. 
billions for ads) necessary to continue to expand the 
market, so the effect would at best only be to slow the 
contraction of the legal drug market. This, however, is 
necessary as shown by many studies covering tobacco 
and alcohol control and extrapolating globally from 
those done on a country with, for example, a smoke 
free goal [35-37]. There is also a risk that legal drug 
companies would dispense with the CEO and lead with 
the VPs. To counteract this, all executives of the 
companies responsible for significant negative health 
impacts would need to be held to a system of 
remuneration similar to equ. 3, but perhaps with 
different S factors. There is also the risk that 
employees or shareholders could try to compensate the 
CEO for profit-maximizing deadly behavior, so there 
would need to be a rigorous enforcement mechanism. 
Finally, it should be noted that because of the revenue 
of the legal drug industry, there is significant influence 
on the states’ budgets, as its contribution to the overall 
tax system is considerable and cannot be neglected. In 
the same vein, the legal drug industry also causes 
secondary economic activity – e.g. increased revenue 
in the medical industry to care for dying addicts. Future 
work is needed to quantify this effect and compare this 
cost to the benefits of improved longevity, health and 
productivity of the workforce. In addition, a 
comparison should be made for the direct government 
costs of this approach (with low direct costs) to more 
traditional health promotion programs [e.g. 8]. Finally, 
it should be pointed out that although improving the 
rules for executive compensation in legal drug 
companies would be expected to improve public 
health, a holistic public health program is still 
necessary. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
  The results of calculating CEO compensation 
per avoidable death indicated a need to target CEO pay 
regulation to potentially save millions of lives. The 
solution proposed here is to incentivize legal drug 
company CEOs, such that they have a constant 
marginal utility per life saved, which is achieved by a 
pay structure that increases exponentially with lives 
saved. Gaming of the system can be minimized by 
global action in order to realize the enormous public 
health benefits of minimizing tobacco and alcohol use. 
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